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ABSTRACT
Indigenous and non-indigenous communities in Latin America make land claims 
and support them with a variety of arguments. Some, such as Zapatistas and the 
Mapuche, have appealed to the “ancestral” or “historical” connections between 
specific communities and the land. Other groups, such as MST in Brazil, have ap-
pealed to the extremely unequal distribution of the land and the effects of this on 
the poor; the land in this case is seen mainly as a means for securing a decent stan-
dard of living for members of disadvantaged groups. Although there is a large lit-
erature on the history as well as the social and political dimensions of land contes-
tations and conflicts in Latin America, the question of whether the land claims put 
forward by disadvantaged groups can be morally justified has not been adequately 
examined. In this essay, we investigate the scope and limits of appeals to what we 
shall call assistance-based, contribution-based, and benefitting-based moral reasons with 
respect to land claims made by these disadvantaged groups. 
Keywords: Land Claims, Rights to Land, Landless Movement, Benefiting from in-
justice, Rectification, Duties to Assist
RESUMEN 
Distintas comunidades en América Latina (indígenas y no indígenas) han realizado recla-
mos de tierras sobre la base de una variedad de argumentos. Algunas de esas comunidades y 
grupos, tal como los zapatistas y el pueblo Mapuche, han efectuado estos reclamos apelando 
a conexiones “ancestrales” o “históricas” entre comunidades específicas y un territorio par-
ticular. Otros grupos, tal como el movimiento sin tierra (MST) en Brasil, sustentan sus re-
clamos en rechazo a una desigual extrema en la distribución de la tierra y los efectos que este 
fenómeno tiene sobre los más pobres. En este caso, la tierra se concibe como un medio esen-
cial para asegurar un nivel de vida digno para los miembros de esos grupos desaventajados. 
Aunque existe una extensa literatura sobre la historia, las dimensiones políticas y sociales de 
los reclamos territoriales en América Latina, la pregunta sobre en qué medida esos reclamos 
puede ser moralmente justificados no ha sido adecuadamente examinada. En este ensayo 
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evaluamos el alcance y límites de los reclamos de tierras realizados por estos grupos desfa-
vorecidos que se sustentan en tres tipos de razones morales: basadas en asistencia (assis-
tance-based), en contribución (contribution-based) y en beneficios (beneffiting-based).
Palabras claves: reclamos territoriales, derechos territoriales, movimiento sin tierra, bene-
ficiarse de la injusticia, rectificación, deber de asistencia
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty years, dozens of social conflicts have taken place in different 
Latin American countries, triggered by unmet land claims. These claims are 
also sometimes accompanied by demands for political self-determination and 
territorial rights. Both indigenous and non-indigenous communities make land 
claims and support them with a variety of arguments. Some, such as Zapatistas 
and the Mapuche, have appealed to the “ancestral” or “historical” connections 
between specific communities and the land. Other groups, such as MST in Brazil 
(Movimento dos Sem Terra or Landless Workers’ Movement), have appealed to the 
extremely unequal distribution of the land and the effects of this on the poor; 
the land in this case is seen mainly as a means for securing a decent standard of 
living for members of disadvantaged groups. 
Although there is a large literature on the history as well as the social and 
political dimensions of land contestations and conflicts in Latin America 
(Yashar 1998; Moyo and Yeros 2005), the question of whether the land claims 
put forward by disadvantaged groups can be morally justified has not been 
adequately examined. It is a difficult undertaking, requiring both a nuanced 
understanding of the history of these conflicts and the political policies open 
to these societies, and an account of the principles relevant to determining if 
the claims are sound, given these facts. Other essays in this special issue help 
to provide a richer understanding of the historical and political contexts of 
these conflicts. This essay explores the nature of some of the arguments that the 
communities involved can make.
In particular, we investigate the scope and limits of appeals to what we shall 
call assistance-based, contribution-based, and benefitting-based moral reasons 
with respect to land claims. Note that we do not evaluate to what extent these 
groups have a warranted legal claim on the land according to the legal systems 
of the countries in question.1 We are simply considering the strength of their 
claims according to some moral principles that seem potentially relevant in this 
context. If there are moral claims to land then these can provide good reasons 
to establish legal claims to it. But moral claims do not entail legal claims, nor 
vice versa. 
1 For instance, an entire chapter of the Brazilian constitution is devoted to agrarian reform and contains 
clauses that authorize the expropriation of rural property that is not performing its social function (Brazil 
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We have no illusions, of course, that resolving land disputes in Latin America is 
an easy task, even at a fairly abstract level. Still, clarifying the scope and limits 
of arguments that these groups might invoke is certainly an important step in 
addressing the complex practical issues involved in assessing their particular 
claims.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In any discussion of land claims, it is important to consider the different 
communities and their relation to the land at issue. We must ask, “What is at 
stake for the parties involved with respect to this particular claim?” In one 
sense, the answer to this question will be simple and uniform: rights to land 
are at stake. And since the land will often be used for farming, possessing the 
means to avoid poverty and improve living standards will also be at stake. 
But much else may be at stake. It may also be that a certain way of life is at stake, 
and that it has particular value to the claimants—that is, land may be a means 
to protect a certain way of life, one that will typically involve not just the life 
of particular individuals but also the communities to which they belong. The 
people making the claims may have what Anna Stilz (2013) has called “located 
life plans” connected to the areas that they are claiming. So the significance 
of a claim will sometimes depend on the importance of the way of life of 
the community for its members, and in particular how the continuity of the 
community protects their interests in maintaining relationships and advancing 
life projects in the place where those projects and relationships have previously 
been developed and pursued (Kolers 2012).
Talk of “ways of life” might seem vague and imprecise, but its meaning is clear 
enough in particular cases. If a community’s practices, rituals, and aesthetic 
sensibilities are strongly connected to the use of a particular territory, it seems 
appropriate to say that their way of life is connected to this territory (Armstrong 
2014). And if a person’s identity and ambitions are closely connected to their 
participation in the life of a community, then the continuation and well-being of 
their community will be important to their personal well-being.
It is also important to recognize the different kinds of claims that may be in 
question. The phrase “land claims” is ambiguous: it may refer to claims to have 
access to land and to move through it, to make productive use of land, or to 
gain fully fledged property rights over land (including the right to pass on 
or exchange the land with others) (Waldron 1988). When the claims are being 
made by an organized collective, they may be more appropriately conceived as 
Constitution, Title VII, Chapter III). This may give landless farmers and others a strong argument, but that 
is not something we discuss here.
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territorial claims, which would confer a range of privileges and powers on the 
group with respect to the land (Kolers 2009).
In conflicts over land, there are typically several groups with something at 
stake. First, both indigenous and non-indigenous people are claiming title to 
land. The land may be currently owned by the state or by private landowners. 
These groups may be seen as the main ones with a stake in the issue, but other 
parties may be relevant to the conflict and its resolution. The rest of society 
may have a stake in whether and how some proposed allocation of land claims 
be carried out—obviously in relation to the extent to which they should be 
asked to bear the cost as a result. If the state is not in possession of the land, it 
may be a question of transferring land to the new owners while at least partly 
compensating the current owners for their losses. In such cases, the question 
will be who, within society, should be asked to bear the cost of such transfers. 
It is important to realize that honoring a land claim may risk imposing undue 
burdens on other groups. When it seems justified that the private landowners 
give up some of their property to the claimants without being compensated, 
much less is at stake for the wider society.
III. ASSISTANCE-BASED RESPONSIBILITIES
Assistance-based moral responsibilities have been frequently appealed 
to in philosophical arguments regarding the responsibilities of affluent 
people to address global poverty, at least since Peter Singer’s (1972) seminal 
article, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” The idea behind assistance-based 
responsibilities is that there is a relevant difference between the prospective 
recipient and the prospective provider of assistance: typically the former is 
at risk of lacking the means to satisfy basic needs, while the latter is able to 
provide such means without incurring a comparable risk, and therefore incurs 
a responsibility to do so.2 
There are different ways to justify assistance-based responsibilities. Singer’s 
analogy is well known: 
if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, 
I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my 
clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child 
would presumably be a very bad thing (Singer 1972: 231).
Just as any passer-by is morally required to make the necessary sacrifice to save 
the child, so too the affluent are required to assist people in need throughout the 
2 The related but distinct capacity- or ability-based reasons (Miller 2001; Caney 2010) allocate responsibilities 
to achieve some end in accordance with the capacity of different agents to further it. When a person has an 
assistance-based responsibility to help another, they must have some capacity to help them, but this does not 
mean that they are most capable of helping them or more capable than any others.
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world. But theorists differ greatly over just how demanding such responsibilities 
are. 
Demandingness
How much cost are we required to bear to assist others in severe need? This 
is a matter of heated dispute among philosophers. Singer has formulated 
three versions of his principle of assistance, all of which demand a quite 
significant level of sacrifice by prospective assistors. He presented the first two 
formulations in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” and the third—the least 
demanding—appears in his book The Life You Can Save (Singer 2009: 15): “if it is 
in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing 
anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so.” But even this principle 
is quite demanding, because anything nearly as important might still be quite 
important when what is at stake for the other person is very important. In our 
view, Singer’s principle seems more plausible at first glance than it does on 
reflection, because what is not nearly as important as something else is often not 
very important at all, such as getting one’s clothes muddy.
How demanding is Singer’s principle? Much depends upon how the notion of 
relative importance is understood; Singer does not give explicit guidance, but 
leaves it up to his readers to interpret on the basis of their intuition (Singer 2009: 
17). It appears to us that even Singer’s least demanding version of a principle of 
assistance is quite demanding. For instance, are we morally required to sacrifice 
our hands or limbs to save the life of a child in front of us? While we do not 
think that this would be required, it is hard to argue that a hand is nearly as 
important as another person’s life. The principle seems implausibly demanding.
Bear in mind that in the initial pond case, all that is at stake for the passer-
by is getting his clothes wet and being late for a meeting. There is no need to 
appeal to anything nearly as demanding as any of Singer’s assistance principles 
to explain the judgment that the passer-by fails in his duty if he fails to rescue 
the child. There are various other, much less demanding principles that would 
explain this. The cost that the passer-by is asked to bear seems minimal indeed. 
Intuitively, though, it doesn’t seem too demanding to ask a person to shoulder 
a moderate cost to prevent something that is really very bad from happening 
to another person. While having an unbecoming haircut or losing a fingernail 
could be widely seen as a minimal cost, the sacrifice of a finger, however, 
seems better described as moderate. Losing a finger is not a negligible loss, but 
compared to what is at stake it is nevertheless relatively moderate. Yet some 
(and perhaps many) would think that you ought to sacrifice a finger to save a 
child, unless perhaps you are a pianist or rely, for some other reason, on having 
all of your fingers to ply your trade or do what you love most.
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Land
The crucial question in this context is, of course, how such assistance-based 
responsibilities would apply to land claims. Note first that assistance-based 
responsibilities seem to get real traction when what is at stake is something 
very important for the prospective recipient of the assistance, and when 
providing the assistance would not impose more than a moderate cost on the 
prospective assistor. We are assuming that the people in question have no 
special connections to each other (such as being friends or family members), in 
which case their responsibilities might be more stringent. While some people 
may think that assistance-based responsibilities could be triggered even when 
there is much less disparity in the means possessed by the prospective assistor 
and recipient—as when a well-off person can take on a cost to avert a very small 
misfortune to another slightly less well-off person—this is not a widely-shared 
view, and we shall not assume it.
Is lack of title to land alone sufficient to trigger assistance-based responsibilities? 
Surely not, if we are interpreting title to land as having rights to exclusionary 
use. Many affluent people in many countries are unlikely to hold land rights 
in this sense, yet are clearly not appropriate recipients of assistance. Of course, 
they do have rights to use and occupy various spaces, but that is different from 
the sorts of claims that groups demanding land typically put forward. Lack of 
title to land must therefore be a proxy, because it is needed to satisfy some other 
relevant need if it is to trigger assistance-based responsibilities.
The most obvious candidate here would be poverty or severe disadvantage. It 
is generally accepted that poverty is materially bad for those suffering it, and 
that it can be demeaning and even humiliating. For these reasons it is ordinarily 
thought to be very important that societies take measures to ensure that it is 
relatively easy for citizens to avoid severe poverty—nearly all discussion of 
assistance-based responsibilities has been oriented toward the question of how 
much cost individuals should take on to address severe poverty. Of course, it is 
a further question whether giving poor people claims to land is the appropriate 
manner of discharging the assistance-based responsibility to relieve their 
poverty: it may not be the most effective way to mitigate their need and may 
not be effective at all. 
Even if it does seem an effective way to mitigate their need, it may well not 
be the least costly way of doing so. It is also not obvious that the manner in 
which assistance is offered should be at the discretion of the recipient; even if 
the recipients of assistance prefer land to money or other goods as a means of 
improving their living standards, it may be that responsibilities to help them 
escape poverty can be met without providing them with land. Indeed, when 
granting title to land is not the most efficient manner of ensuring that the basic 
needs of recipients are met and there is a limited amount of resources that 
those providing assistance are responsible to give, they may be required not 
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to discharge their responsibilities through giving title to land, since doing so 
would result in fewer people having their basic needs met.
The second way in which assistance-based responsibilities could come into play 
is that land, or a particular piece of land, is essentially linked to other aspects of 
the well-being of the people in need. As noted, people might feel a very strong 
connection to the land because they have located life plans there; severing a 
connection to the land that is so tightly tied to their sense of identity may cause 
them great distress. Of course, this type of argument will only apply to those 
cases where the well-being of those claiming title to land is, as a matter of fact, 
closely linked to that land.3 
Indigenous groups might also seek autonomy and some independence from 
the larger community in order to secure and be able to control their future. The 
extent to which their way of life differs from that of the larger community may 
entail a need for space to do this. It may be that possessing claims to land will 
be essential for them to—or make them best able to—secure this type of control, 
even if they are not materially poor.
It may seem harder to argue that non-indigenous people’s well-being is 
essentially tied to land, let alone to a particular piece of land. Of course, farmers 
sometimes talk as if this were the case, but it is not clear that this claim should 
be treated differently from claims for assistance by miners, academics or artists, 
who may argue that their well-being is essentially tied to a particular kind of 
work. Even so, this doesn’t mean that such considerations should play no role 
in determining claims to land. It may be that certain “traditional” trades, like 
farming, should be given extra weight as a practical matter, since practitioners 
may lack education and therefore be less able to adapt and participate fruitfully 
in other areas of economic activity, thus making it more likely that their well-
being is indeed dependent on a way of life that is linked to the land. Providing 
land may also sometimes be the most effective way to solve a particular conflict, 
and also the most efficient way to provide “assistance” to groups of people who 
are capable of using the land to achieve decent standards of living.
But there are limits to employing arguments that assert assistance-based 
responsibilities to support land claims. While there is relatively widespread 
agreement that poverty can trigger assistance-based responsibilities, there seems 
to be less agreement that the lack of well-being that some people may experience 
(falling short of poverty) as a consequence of not having title to land also 
triggers assistance-based responsibilities. A person’s material (or “objective”) 
well-being may well diverge from that person’s well-being as they themselves 
understand it. But as Scanlon (1975) has pointed out, when deliberating about 
the distribution of resources, we often give weight to considerations of material 
rather than subjective well-being; he gives the example of a man who would 
3 For a skeptical view of such claims, see Ypi (2017).
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prefer to build a monument to his god than to eat, and argues that we should 
nevertheless take his claims to food more seriously than his claims to help in 
building his monument. 
Poor farmers
The most widely applicable type of argument that poor farmers can employ 
appeals to assistance-based responsibilities. The farmers are in severe need, 
which can be met by access to productive land; moreover, providing them with 
such land may not be very costly. This sort of argument seems to have a great 
deal of traction in countries, like Brazil, with a very unequal distribution of land. 
In Brazil, a large proportion of farmland is unproductive and many millions live 
in extreme poverty (UNICEF 2017). Given that the plight of these disadvantaged 
groups could be alleviated by giving them land—public or private—on which 
no one depends, there would appear to be an assistance-based responsibility for 
the Brazilian government to do so.
It may therefore be no surprise that on 16 April 1996, 12,000 landless squatters 
built an encampment in the Fazenda Giacometi, an unused property of 80,000 
hectares in Paraná, Brazil. It was the biggest illegal occupation by the MST, 
the largest grassroots movement in Latin America, founded in 1984 to fight 
for agrarian reform and land rights for poorer communities. MST in Brazil has 
repeatedly appealed to the extremely unequal distribution of the land and its 
effects on the poor (Carter 2005). Over the past 15 years 1% of the landowners 
(around 40,000 latifundiários or ranchers) have been in possession of over 40% 
of the land (around 360 million hectares), while about 25 million peasants—
mainly mestizos and the descendants of European immigrants—remained 
landless (Stedile 2002; Pericás 2017). The MST views its initiatives as consistent 
with the principles underlying the underutilized constitutional provisions for 
the expropriation of rural property that is not performing its social function 
(Brazil Constitution, Title VII, Chapter III). 
Clearly, if poor farmers demand title to land because of assistance-based 
responsibilities, they will compete with other needy groups in society, such 
as those who live in the shantytowns of urban centres. It seems unlikely that 
assistance-based arguments should give any particular preference to farmers 
above poor urban dwellers (for instance, based on the idea that farmers have a 
particularly close connection to the land and that their well-being is therefore 
connected to farming). Any redistribution of land, where the larger society bears 
its cost, must simultaneously be weighed against improving the conditions for 
all poor people in the society. This is not to say that there will always be a conflict 
between solving land disputes and improving the conditions of the urban poor: 
giving impoverished farmers title to productive land may benefit poor urban 
dwellers simply by reducing the number of poor people migrating to the towns. 
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IV. CONTRIBUTION-BASED RESPONSIBILITIES
The second argument we want to consider is based on the idea that because 
either the communities who are claiming title to land or their ancestors were 
unjustly dispossessed, and these communities have consequently been kept in 
a state of poverty and deprivation due to their continued exclusion from the 
land, the state and those who currently occupy the land have a responsibility 
to rectify this situation by reforming the current legal order that sustains it. We 
call the responsibilities arising in such contexts contribution-based responsibilities 
(Barry 2005). 
Contribution-based moral reasons play a very substantial role in many people’s 
moral thinking. This is true for retrospective assessment, in that the significance 
of one’s reasons to bring remedy to or to compensate for severe deprivations 
that occurred in the past is generally taken to depend in part upon whether one 
has contributed to these deprivations. It is also true for prospective assessment, 
in that the significance of our reasons to address presently occurring severe 
deprivations and to prevent future deprivations is generally taken to depend 
in part upon whether our past or present conduct is contributing or will have 
contributed to their occurrence.
Contribution-based responsibilities are widely acknowledged. Most people 
affirm that there are stringent moral requirements for us not to contribute to 
wrongful harm and to compensate those who have been wrongfully harmed as 
a consequence of us failing to meet these requirements. It is very important not 
to do or enable harm to innocent others, and if we do so, we must compensate 
those to whose harms we have contributed (Pogge 2002). Since most people 
view contribution-based responsibilities as quite stringent and demanding, 
appealing to them (at least when such appeals are plausible) may have greater 
motivational force than appeals to assistance-based responsibilities (Lawford-
Smith 2012). The violation or usurpation of rightful land claims is generally 
acknowledged as a clear-cut case of injustice or wrongdoing, even by those who 
are skeptical about other ideas of distributive justice (Nozick 1974; Boxill 2003). 
It is no surprise, then, that land claims are often framed by an appeal to some 
unjust appropriation that occurred in the past.
Historical contribution
The most straightforward argument that indigenous people employ is to appeal 
to historical injustices. They may argue that the land they are now claiming 
title to is in fact their land (Thompson 2001; Torpey 2003). In such cases, the 
alleged contribution refers to the wrongful dispossession of particular lands 
that previously belonged to these groups. This argument is typically invoked 
when indigenous peoples demand that “ancestral” or “historical” territories 
be returned to them, as in the case of the Mapuche in the Araucanía Region 
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in Chile (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009), the Awajún and Wampis in the 
Peruvian Amazon (Acuña 2015), and the indigenous peasants in Chiapas, 
Mexico (Harvey 1998). 
The Mapuche claim that the “historical debt” owed to them by the Chilean state 
goes back as far as the end of the 19th century, when they were deemed to have a 
valid claim to only 500,000 hectares (5% of what they had traditionally inhabited 
and then claimed). They also demand restoration of the 300,000 hectares taken 
from them during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–90) (Aylwin 2000). In 
the case of the Zapatistas, one of their principal grievances concerns how the 
privatizations carried out by recent Mexican governments have marginalized 
and impoverished indigenous communities, sometimes forcing them out of the 
areas that they had traditionally inhabited (Collier and Quaratiello 2005).
But there are challenges that must be faced when invoking such arguments. 
For arguments asserting contribution-based responsibilities to get traction, it 
must be possible to identify those people who have contributed to a wrongful 
harm (the contributors) and those to whose hardships their wrongdoing has 
contributed (the victims). Let’s call this the identification challenge. If we can 
identify the contributors but not the victims, or if we discover that the victims are 
all deceased, the contributors may be blamed, punished, or forced to disgorge 
their ill-gotten gains, but it is not clear that they owe any compensation to anyone 
who now exists. If we can identify the victims but not the perpetrators, it may 
be clear that some people deserve compensation but prove difficult to identify 
particular people who have contribution-based responsibilities to provide it.4
The identification challenge can be significant in land claims. For instance, in a 
great many cases the individuals who were directly deprived of their land are no 
longer alive, and the connections that their descendants have to the land may be 
tenuous. The perpetrators who unjustly usurped the land also no longer exist. 
This can make it difficult or even impossible to determine, on contribution-based 
grounds alone, who should be compensated, how they should be compensated, 
and who should bear the cost of compensation.
Sometimes the state or some other collective agent is held to play the role of the 
past contributor. If it was the state that perpetrated the injustice and expelled 
indigenous people from their land, the state may have some responsibility 
to compensate descendants of the victims. States are typically taken to 
persist through time (and to sustain duties through time), even if particular 
governments and the individuals comprising them—and the ordinary citizens 
who sustain them—change (and indeed even if they undergo regime change). 
Even if it were not the state that expelled people from their land, the state 
may nevertheless have a responsibility to offer compensation to the victims, 
4 There may be some tendency, of course, to give more consideration to the claims of people who are in need 
as a result of wrongdoing than to those who are in need for other reasons (like a natural disaster), but it is 
unclear that this is justifiable.
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because it enabled the perpetrators to carry out their misdeeds, or should have 
prevented or regulated differently what took place. 
Another aspect of the identification challenge is the so-called “non-identity 
problem.” Altogether different people would now be alive had history taken 
a different trajectory, including one in which the injustices in question had not 
taken place (Parfit 1987; Broome 1992). In what sense, then, can we identify 
people alive now as the victims of such wrongful harm, at least insofar as their 
lives are worth living?5
Furthermore, such arguments must determine what is owed to the victim of the 
past wrongdoing or their descendants. One common strategy is to appeal to 
counterfactuals. Individual claims to rectification are based on what would have 
happened had the initial injustice not occurred; for example, it is asserted that 
if the injustice had not taken place, the descendants of the victims would now 
be better off than they are, while the descendants of those who perpetrated the 
injustice would be worse off than they are. Jeremy Waldron (1988) has pointed 
out that such claims may amount to no more than mere conjecture. Would the 
traditional owners of the land have held on to it and increased its value? Would 
they instead have sold or squandered it? We will not always be able to answer 
these questions with much confidence. 
Another option is to say that the descendants of the victims are entitled to what 
they would have had if their forebears had retained their land and behaved 
prudently, whether or not this seems likely (Cohen 2009). A difficulty with this 
claim, as Waldron (1992) argues, is that often we don’t define entitlements by 
what it would have been rational to do, but rather by what was in fact done, and 
it’s a safe assumption that in many cases what would have been done would 
have been irrational. If a person makes a bet that they can be expected to lose, 
and they do in fact lose, we treat that bet as defining their entitlements—they lose 
their entitlement to the money that they placed on the bet. If the gambler then 
says, “I am entitled to keep that money because if I had been acting rationally 
I never would have taken the bet,” we don’t think this carries much weight. So 
what allows us to uphold entitlements based on hypothetical rational choices in 
the one example but not the other?
In any case, we also need to consider how plausible it is to apply such 
counterfactuals in order to assess a person’s contribution-based responsibilities. 
Suppose Bill has decided to steal his neighbor’s car and camping wagon the 
next day and to set off on a long journey. But just before he does it, Jane steals 
the car, destroys it in a crash, and ends up safe at the hospital. As it now stands, 
Bill’s neighbor is better off than if Jane had not stolen the car, but that doesn’t 
mean that she is not required to compensate him for the destruction of his car.
5 We will set this difficult issue aside in what follows.
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The problem with historical contribution-based arguments therefore seems 
to be something else, which is related to the passing of time and a blurred 
understanding of the specific causal links. When Jane is asked to compensate 
Bill’s neighbor, we can identify clearly the relevant causal links between her 
and the victim, and what she is required to offer by way of compensation; by 
contrast, we lack understanding of the causal links in many historical cases. 
However, if a counterfactual understanding of harm seems wrong for simple 
cases, there is little reason to think that it is correct in more complex instances. 
The relevant uncertainties in relation to claims in complex historical cases, then, 
would be about knowing the specific causal processes and not about the truth 
of various counterfactuals.
A further challenge to arguments that use contribution-based responsibilities 
to support land claims is that circumstances can change in ways that make 
complete restitution of land unjustified. Given population growth and scarce 
resources, justice may require that the original owners of land share it with 
others, including the descendants of those who unjustly appropriated the land 
from their ancestors (Waldron 1988). Furthermore, the land of which people 
were unjustly dispossessed may now be inhabited by people who were not 
involved in this dispossession and who now have located life plans tied to 
these territories (Stilz 2013). As for indigenous groups such as Zapatistas and 
the Mapuche, their “ancestral” or “historical” connections between specific 
communities and the land may have been severed or weakened substantially, 
not least during the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s (Carruthers and 
Rodriguez 2009). In some cases, the indigenous groups or their representatives 
may in fact have agreed to “sell” their land a long time ago, albeit under varying 
degrees of coercion. 
This does not, of course, mean that such considerations entirely disregard land 
claims made by unjustly deprived people and communities, particularly with 
respect to more recent injustices that have deprived these groups of resources 
that were rightly theirs, or where the land to which communities are making 
claims has larger cultural significance for them (Sher 1981, 2005). Rather, it makes 
determinations of the appropriate form and degree of restitution complex and, 
consequently, a matter of reasonable controversy. It may also be worth observing 
that the communities making historical claims in Latin America do not typically 
demand that all lands traditionally held be returned to them, but rather that 
they receive some share of these lands. Waldron claims that when, due to 
changing circumstances, the land must now be shared by the original owners, 
this is incompatible with the claim that these owners should be compensated 
for having to share the land; on Waldron’s account, the changing circumstances 
target entitlements to the land, not the claim for compensation. So it seems that 
his argument needs an extra step: why do changing circumstances entail that 
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current owners must share the land and, at the same time, undermine their 
claim for compensation for having to do so?6
There is a different type of historical contribution-based argument that bypasses 
these difficulties. This sort of argument (a version of which has been made 
forcefully in the context of reparations to descendants of African-American 
slaves by Bernard Boxill) focuses on the injustice done not to the original 
owners but to their descendants. The idea is that insofar as reparation for 
injustice is withheld from its initial victims, this may impose a fresh injustice 
on their descendants. When a group usurps land from Luiz, it harms him; 
insofar as it continues to sustain the harm he suffers by preventing him from 
being compensated or regaining title to the land, it continues to contribute to 
his deprivation, and it may also thereby contribute to the deprivations of his 
children. When Luiz dies, he will no longer be unjustly harmed—nor will his 
children “inherit” these claims, but they will retain their claims to reparation for 
the unjust harms they have suffered. 
Those who have made this sort of argument have typically conceived of the 
harms suffered in terms of costs that would not have been borne had reparation 
been made (Boxill 2003; Sher 2005). We think this idea is a mistake, for the 
same reasons that it is a mistake to ground other historical contribution-based 
arguments in counterfactuals. Even if the children would have been worse 
off if their parents had received reparation (imagine that this would have had 
perverse incentives), this would not seem to defeat their claim to reparation: 
what actually occurred was a process through which they were unjustly harmed, 
and the fact that some other process might have harmed them more is irrelevant 
from the moral point of view—so long as the prevention of this greater harm 
was in no way a motivation of the parties who caused the harm. 
Institutional contribution
Due to the generational problem of historical injustice, it may be wise to explore 
another type of contribution-based argument. Indigenous groups may allege that 
currently affluent people and state officials have contributed to injustices that 
they have suffered by upholding and enforcing an unjust institutional order—
laws and other social rules governing what kinds of things can be owned (and 
by whom); how they can be acquired, transferred, relinquished, and forfeited; 
how markets and the production systems are structured; the manner in which 
decisions concerning education and health are made; and so on—that has kept 
these communities in a severely disadvantaged position. 
6 Suppose my friend is kicked out of his home and can’t find any new accommodation (the circumstances of 
the rental market mean that there is nothing available for him). In light of his vulnerability, perhaps I ought 
to share my spare room with him, but that doesn’t mean I can’t demand he contribute to sharing the costs of 
maintaining it.
CHRISTIAN BARRY • GERHARD ØVERLAND
726
In some instances, it is claimed, governments have inherited unjust arrangements 
from illegitimate predecessor regimes but have failed to reform them. One of 
the main complaints of the Mapuche, for example, is that since 1990 successive 
democratic governments have ignored their demands to be compensated for 
injustices perpetrated by the Pinochet dictatorship (Lavanchy 1999). In other 
cases, groups claim that governments have enacted policies that have further 
contributed to their deprivations, or that governments have failed to enforce 
laws and agreements that would have protected them.
Such arguments bring to mind a notion of contribution that has been 
emphasized in recent years by the philosopher Thomas Pogge, who argues 
that when affluent people collaborate, avoidably, in imposing an institutional 
order in which people’s human rights foreseeably go unfulfilled (a relatively 
minimal conception of justice), they are contributors to injustice and have 
stringent duties to reform these institutions and to compensate those who suffer 
as a result of them (Pogge 2002). This notion of contribution is based on a prior 
conception of justice. Those who do not make efforts to reform institutions that 
are unjust, withdraw from participation in the social domains they govern, or 
compensate those who are treated unjustly by them, have contribution-based 
responsibilities to address the needs of those who suffer under them. 
This institutional argument has broader scope than those based on past 
contribution. It may therefore also apply to poor farmers, such as the MST in 
Brazil, who have in many cases not been dispossessed of land. If it could be 
argued that poor farmers are poor because some agents have made them so, or 
at least helped to perpetuate their poverty, then it could be argued on the basis 
of contribution-based reasons that those who have contributed to this ought 
to compensate these poor farmers. If the MST and poor farmers in general can 
appeal to contribution-based moral reasons, it seems that they would need to 
appeal to an institutional type of contribution. They may argue that affluent 
people and state officials have contributed to injustices that their communities 
have suffered by upholding and enforcing an unjust order that has kept them in 
a severely disadvantaged position.
However, while this institutional argument has broader scope than those based 
on past contribution, it invokes a substantive conception of justice, and is 
therefore likely to be more controversial than cases of straightforward theft and 
dispossession—just how controversial depends on the substantive conception 
that is supposed. 
V. BENEFITTING-BASED RESPONSIBILITIES
An additional moral reason that may be appealed to by groups making land 
claims is that various social actors within their societies have benefitted or are 
benefitting from wrongful harm that they have suffered or are suffering. This 
argument—less common than arguments of the first two sorts—appeals to the 
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idea that, even if the state and current occupiers of the land did not cause or 
could not have prevented the unjust exclusion of people from the land, they 
have a duty to compensate the wronged people because they have benefitted 
from these injustices. Even if specific affluent individuals in Latin America have 
not contributed to an injustice, and even if they were not in a particularly salient 
position to have prevented the injustice from occurring or to have assisted its 
victims when it occurred, they may still—if they benefit or have benefitted from 
the injustice—have some additional responsibility to bear cost now to help 
those who suffered the injustice. 
In discussing contribution-based responsibilities, we noted that the past 
contribution of some agents to unjustified harm does not necessarily generate 
duties on the part of the present generation, since this generation may not have 
contributed to such harm. This makes it important to understand the extent 
to which contemporary beneficiaries of such harm can have responsibilities 
toward people who suffer as a result of it. There is an important difference 
between contribution-based arguments and beneficiary-based arguments: only 
in the former do we need to identify the contributors to the injustice or harm 
in question, even though the beneficiaries of injustice may also be contributors.
There are various ways in which this principle of benefitting from injustice 
might be understood. For our purposes, we will understand the principle of 
benefitting from injustice as stating that agents have a particularly weak claim 
on the benefits that have been derived from an injustice and may for that 
reason be required to relinquish some of these benefits to those who suffer as a 
consequence of the injustice. 
It seems hard to deny that many people living in settler societies have captured 
benefits arising from wrongs done to the indigenous populations of the lands in 
which their ancestors settled (Miller 2004, 2010). In the case of Latin America, the 
Spanish, Portuguese, and (later) other European immigrants populated these 
territories to the exclusion of the indigenous peoples. It seems quite plausible 
that beneficiary-based responsibilities may play an important role in the current 
debates about land claims in such formerly colonized societies. The fact that 
many of the descendants of these European immigrants—often members of the 
local elite—enjoy a high standard of living seems to confirm that they benefitted 
and will continue to benefit from those past injustices (Ypi et al. 2009; UNDP 
2010).7 
The idea is that when the current owners acquired their land cheaply due to a 
past injustice, the former occupiers may have a stronger claim on this land, or 
part of it, than if they simply had to appeal to the assistance-based responsibilities 
7 It is worth noting that an important difficulty for considering the application of benefitting-based responsi-
bilities is the large number of mestizo people in Latin America. Here it may be quite difficult to differentiate 
benefits and burdens when a great many people stand in a complex relationship to earlier injustices. We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point to us.
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of these owners and others. Insofar as the current landholders have benefitted 
from an injustice and their claims to it correspondingly weakened, it may be 
easier to redistribute some of this land to people who are the descendants of 
those who used to occupy the land.
Such arguments could plausibly be directed against present landholders of areas 
that previously were populated by the indigenous peoples or that have been 
currently acquired under laws or agreements of dubious origins—for example, 
decreed by illegitimate rulers or signed without the consent of the majority. 
But just as one can benefit from a past injustice and therefore may be held 
responsible for compensating the victims of the injustice, one may also benefit 
from present injustices that are engendered by the institutional order that 
prevails in a society. This means that people who are affluent under the current 
scheme may have a particularly weak claim on their assets: these assets may 
be “tainted” by having been obtained (although innocently) by their owners 
through the imposition of an unjust scheme. If the argument based on such 
benefits is correct, this would imply that the owners may have to relinquish 
some of these benefits to the victims of the past and ongoing injustice.
In what way can groups like MST appeal to benefitting-based moral reasons to 
support their claim on (farm) land? For one thing, they can complain that the 
present holders of vast landed estates are the beneficiaries of past injustices. 
These landholders benefitted from the creation of latifundiários that unjustly 
excluded people from land that was subsequently passed to them; they received 
their land—cheaply, too—because other people were expelled from it. Second, 
MST can complain about a present unjust institutional scheme that continues 
to benefit rich landholders. In this case, MST has a better claim to some of the 
assets in question since its members are also victims of the current institutional 
injustice. 
Scope
Arguments that assert beneficiary-based responsibilities share some of the 
features of those relating to contribution-based responsibilities, and consequently 
are vulnerable to similar challenges. For example, if such arguments are to be 
cogent, it must be possible to establish some relation between the beneficiaries 
of particular injustices and their victims; this depends on establishing causal 
relations between these sets of people and the wrongful harm that was originally 
inflicted. But although the relations are causal, they are causal in a very different 
way from those based on contribution—the idea is not that the beneficiary 
caused the injustice but that whatever caused the injustice also caused the 
benefits received by some person(s). 
If, for whatever reason, your benefits are derived from an injustice, then your 
claim to these benefits is correspondingly weakened, and you may consequently 
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be required to give up some or all of these benefits in order to help the victims 
of the injustice. Even if you have received similar (or greater) benefits from 
another source in the absence of the injustice, your present benefits are still 
“tainted” by the injustice from which they arise. Nor does this duty depend on 
counterfactual judgments about what would have happened to the victim had 
the injustice not occurred: if you receive benefits arising from Jane’s theft of the 
car, it does not matter that Bill would have stolen the car had she not done so. 
That these benefits are tainted by injustice weakens your claim to them.
There is, of course, a different view of benefitting-based responsibilities that 
holds that talk of benefitting from an injustice implies that someone is made 
better off by its occurrence relative to a counterfactual baseline: some state 
of the world to which another state of the world can be compared. This view 
holds that we can only begin to understand what it means to benefit from 
injustice by examining the different baselines—historical or counterfactual—
that are implicitly or explicitly adopted when people claim that some agent is a 
beneficiary of injustice. 
We think that this way of understanding benefitting-based responsibilities is 
problematic, just as it is problematic to think of contributing to harm in such 
terms. Recall again the case where Bill has decided to steal his neighbor’s car 
and camping wagon the next day and set off on a long journey, but Jane pre-
empts him by stealing the car and crashing it. As it now stands, Bill’s neighbor 
is better off than if Jane had not stolen the car, but that doesn’t mean that she is 
not required to compensate him for the destroyed car. Benefitting from injustice 
can be understood in a similar way. When it is a fact that certain material goods 
causally derive from an injustice, then those who are in possession of them have 
some additional moral reasons to relinquish them. This means ultimately that 
the unjust event may not have been a benefit to them, all things considered, since 
they could have fared even better if the unjust event had not happened. This is 
important for the question that concerns us—it implies that we do not need to 
consider how well off landholders would have been today in the absence of the 
past injustice. As long as there is a clear causal link between that injustice and 
the current material belongings of the landholders, then we can say that their 
claims to retain the land are weakened.
As a general matter, it will often be unclear how and to what extent particular 
affluent people have benefitted from past injustices—for example, what is the 
causal link between the current wealth of white Americans and the slavery 
that their ancestors carried out? But land may be special in this regard: in such 
cases, we may indeed have a fairly clear understanding of the causal link. Some 
groups have wrongfully lost their “right” to use particular plots of land, while 
others have received legally enforceable claims to this land.
It is not clear just how broad the scope of beneficiary-based responsibilities is. 
Some benefits seem entirely incidental to the wrongs on which they causally 
depend, and many benefits that causally result from injustice do not come at 
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the expense of its victims—for example, the benefits received by the doctor 
in a war-torn region, far from coming at the expense of those who are being 
wronged by the conflict, arise from activities that are an important means of 
helping them. Cases of benefitting from injustice that result in weakened claims 
to retain benefits, on the other hand, typically involve the transfer of value from 
the victims to the beneficiaries. The cases that interest us in this essay—unjust 
appropriations of land—are those where the benefits received come at the 
expense of the victims of the wrong, involve the transfer of material value from 
victims to beneficiaries, and are not incidental to the wrongdoings that caused 
them. 
Another question in determining the validity of land claims is the extent to 
which rich farmers acquired their land in good faith. Did they have reason 
to believe that, when they were granted legal title to the land, it was at the 
cost of some other people who used to occupy it? If so, their claim on the land 
today may be further weakened; if not, then it is easier for them to defend their 
rights to retain at least some land. It is not clear that all those who currently 
possess large areas of land in Latin America can be characterized as good-faith 
purchasers—anyone who is aware of Brazil’s history, for instance, would have 
reason to question whether such lands are legitimately held.
Stolen goods
When the benefits are stolen goods—or goods that are mistakenly given to 
some who are not entitled to them, to the detriment of those who are entitled 
to them (as in the case of mistaken payments or misdelivered goods)—there 
is a strong presumption that the beneficiaries should return the goods to their 
proper owners. Indeed, duties of this type are incorporated in many modern 
legal codes: those who have mistakenly received goods or services owed to 
others, for example, must forfeit them or provide compensation to those who 
have been unjustly deprived of them (Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul 1987; 
Birks 2005). 
It may be argued in some situations where indigenous people are claiming title 
to land that what is at stake are stolen goods that have been passed on to others. 
Those parcels of land that can be shown to have been stolen may thus arguably 
belong to the victims’ descendants rather than to the current owners. But these 
arguments cannot often be straightforwardly applied to land claims when the 
parcels of land in question were stolen generations ago. If all land should be 
returned to its “original” owners, nearly all of it would have to change hands. 
Such redistribution would certainly create many practical quandaries, but there 
are principled concerns too. And, of course, property-based arguments depend 
on a theory of just initial acquisition; it is unclear how confident we can be that 
land has been acquired at any point in time in accordance with such principles 
(so long as their content does not reduce to might makes right.)
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There may be reasons why some of the goods should not be returned to their 
original owners. These sorts of issues arise particularly in lawyers’ talk of 
“good-faith purchasers” of tangible goods. For example, imagine you bought 
a stolen car in all good faith; the asking price was not ridiculously low and you 
had no reason to suppose that the title certificate was forged. The treatment 
of good-faith purchasers in the law is mixed, but at least sometimes the law 
says that we should leave the good-faith purchaser in possession of the goods. 
Presumably, the thought that lies behind that policy, in places where it is in force, 
is simply that: “After all, the purchaser in good faith paid a fair price for the car; 
he put the right amount of his own money into it; he deserves to have the car in 
consequence.” We thus hesitate to require good-faith purchasers to return the 
goods to the original owner where they have by now incorporated them into 
their own plans and projects that would be disrupted, imposing costs on them 
that may well exceed the benefits they derived from the goods (Goodin and 
Barry 2014). Were we confident that the benefits received instead exceeded the 
costs to them of returning the goods, we would of course be much less hesitant.
Similar considerations apply to the law of “unjust enrichment.” Someone who 
receives a mistaken payment is unjustly enriched and is held strictly liable to 
return the monies transferred once they become aware of the mistake. But those 
who are unaware that they have been unjustly enriched and innocently rely 
upon the validity of the enrichment in ways that would make them very badly 
off were they now to return the payment can employ the defence of “change of 
position” in common law to reduce or altogether eliminate their liability (Birks 
2005). 
There are still further complicating factors. A second reason for supposing that 
the innocent beneficiary need not disgorge all—or, perhaps in the limiting case, 
any—of the benefits he received through the wrongdoing is that they are now 
inextricably intermingled with other benefits that are rightfully his, and the 
former cannot now be returned without unreasonable levels of damage to the 
latter (Goodin and Barry 2014). The innocent beneficiary’s current holdings will 
typically be predicated partly upon his own contributions, and those in turn may 
have been predicated upon the wrongful benefit or may have interacted with it. 
We ordinarily think that people deserve to keep that portion of what they possess 
that is due to their own contributions, but if these are inextricably intertwined 
with wrongful benefits, the two principles are in clear tension: people cannot 
keep what is rightfully theirs without keeping what they have received as a 
consequence of injustice, and they cannot give back what they have wrongfully 
received without also relinquishing something that is rightfully theirs. Which 
principle should prevail over the other in such cases is an open question, and 
one that will presumably—at least sometimes—be decided in favor of keeping 
it all rather than relinquishing it all. In this case, it seems sensible to allow the 
possessor to keep the benefits that are intermingled in their own contributions, 
but also to require that they pay some appropriate value in compensation that 
does not amount to giving back the very object that they wrongfully received.
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Just how these considerations apply to the issue of land claims is a difficult 
question and will likely vary greatly from case to case. Of course, large areas of 
land may be divided, hence there might be a way to resolve such conflicts in a 
reasonably fair manner by allowing current landholders to keep some of their 
land while redistributing some to the descendants of previous occupiers.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Arguments that assert assistance-based responsibilities are available to both 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups whenever they can point to some severe 
need on their part, and the capacity of others to remedy these needs at moderate 
costs. But there are two potential weaknesses with this type of argument 
in relation to land claims: it generally seems to be rather undemanding and 
therefore may lack motivational force, and it gives no particular significance to 
the issue of land claims.
Arguments that assert contribution-based responsibilities may initially be 
judged to be quite demanding and might therefore be thought to have more 
motivational force. Such arguments also single out the specific importance of 
land claims, since past injustices often consisted of the expulsion of the original 
occupiers (and users of land areas) from the land. The main problem with this 
type of argument is that we need to identify the contributors in order to hold 
them responsible, and this is not always an easy task. The fact that those who 
committed, colluded, and conspired in a historical injustice are often dead 
raises difficulties. But it may nevertheless be possible to hold the state to some 
extent accountable for such injustices. However, the state may nevertheless not 
currently be in possession of the land in question and may not therefore be in a 
position to compensate the past victims or their descendants. Although the state 
may have responsibilities to help protect victims of injustices performed by the 
state, it is not obvious that it can legitimately redistribute large areas of land.
Arguments that assert beneficiary-based responsibilities do not depend on 
identifying the perpetrators of the injustice in order to hold them responsible for 
the wrong and to compensate the victims. Instead, these arguments depend on 
identifying the beneficiaries of injustice and indicating why this should reduce 
their claim to holding on to these benefits. This may be possible with regard to 
land claims in Latin America where a very few families are in possession of very 
large areas; it may accordingly be argued that these families have a weak claim 
on this land, and for that reason it is somewhat easier to justify redistributing 
some of it.
The three types of moral arguments that we have identified may be used in 
combination to support land claims for various groups. For example, it may be 
argued that the state has contribution-based responsibilities to try to mitigate the 
wrongs that it has done or enabled (and continues to do and enable). Affluent 
people may be required to shoulder at least moderate costs during this process, 
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and this may be due to their assistance-based responsibilities to the victims 
of wrongdoing, along with the fact that they have benefitted from injustices 
inflicted or sustained by the state. They may also be responsible for contributing 
to the maintenance of unjust features of their contemporary institutions.
As for the affluent landholders, they may have a particularly weak claim on the 
land that they possess as a result of the fact that they have benefitted from past 
and current injustices. This does not imply that they must immediately leave 
their land and hand it over to poor farmers and indigenous groups, but it does 
mean that it may be somewhat easier to justify a forced redistribution of some of 
the land areas they currently possess—this can therefore make it permissible for 
the state to enforce some redistribution of land that is currently held by affluent 
farmers who have benefitted from past injustices. In this process, both the state 
and the affluent in general may be asked to bear some cost so that the affluent 
landholders are not the only ones who bear it; for instance, landholders who are 
forced to give up some land may be compensated at least partly for their losses. 
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